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WILTmaM

In a scant 173 pages of text, William Forbath sets for himself a formidable task: demonstrating empirically that law is not merely reactive, reflecting the social, political, and economic forces and policies of its day,
but that law itself influences the social, political, and economic interests
that, in turn, affect the law. "Among historians and social and political
scientists as with law professors, scholarship about law and society has emphasized the ways that the interests of social groups shape the law; it has
slighted the ways that law shapes the very interests that play upon it" (at
x). In his vision of "law-in-history," Forbath sides with the critics of traditional historical interpretation, challenging the idea that law and legal doctrine can be explained simply as adaptive responses to social needs.'
Forbath, however, does not limit himself to trying to demonstrate that
law has an independent historical effect. He also seeks to inquire how law
influences social actors. One possible explanation, he suggests, is associated with social choice theory. It posits that law, like other social, political,
and economic forces, may operate to constrain the pragmatic and strategic
choices made by historical actors (at xi). While that is surely part of the
picture, Forbath adopts a more radical theory: that the "ideological,
discursive, and symbolic dimensions of the law" may have an independent
Carol Chomsky is associate professor of law, University of Minnesota. The author
wishes to thank Steven Befort, Laura Cooper, and Steven Liss for helpful comments on
earlier drafts.
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impact as well. Those affected by the law do not simply calculate material
costs and benefits, thereby deciding how to react to legal developments.
Rather, ideology and culture-including, in some times and some places,
legal ideology and culture-help to determine how people respond to
"material constraints and constellations Of social power" (at xii). The language and structure of the law, Forbath suggests, may affect the way in
which historical actors think about their problems and craft solutions to
them. Law has a "constitutive" power, shaping as well as reflecting consciousness. 2
Forbath's subject is the American labor movement of the late 19th
and early 20th centuries and the impact that law-particularly judge-made
law-had on the strategies and goals of labor and its leaders. He focuses on
two forms of judicial activity with respect to labor. the invalidation of protective legislation, such as minimum wage and maximum hour statutes, as
unconstitutional invasions of liberty of contract; and the use of injunctions to bar workers from engaging in collective activity. Consistent with
his description of social choice theory, Forbath seeks to demonstrate that
these "harsh constraints and significant incentives forged by the nation's
courts" led American trade unionists to make "hard-nosed choices that
importantly narrowed their political and industrial paths" (at xi). More
radically, he suggests that the language of judge-made law "set... many of
the key terms of public discourse and debate" on labor issues, affecting
how trade unionists thought of labor's role and how they articulated their
aspirations and organizational philosophy, both to the public and to themselves (at xii). The law not only made them act differently, it also made
3
them think differently.
Law and the Shaping of the American Labor Movement is most successful
in its narrower goal: It effectively demonstrates that the decisions of the
courts caused the labor movement to channel its activities away from strategies blocked by contemporary legal doctrine, thereby altering the organizational focus of the unions. This is, in itself, a substantial accomplishment, reconfiguring our understanding of this transformative period in
labor history. Forbath may be correct in concluding that the language of
the law also had an independent impact on labor ideology, that "labor's
embrace" of the courts' discourse "displaced a more radical vocabulary of
reform" (at 8), but he is much less successful in establishing that fact. It is
2. For other discussions of the "constitutive" power of law on consciousness, see, e.g.,
Gordon, 36 Stan. L Rev. at 109-16; Martha Minow, Making All the Difference: Inclusion, Exclusion, and American Lau 1-11 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990); Patricia J. Williams, The Alchemy of Race and Rights 8-12, 98-110 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 1991).
3. See also Leon Fink's complementary look at American trade union behavior and
attitudes in "Labor, Liberty, and the Law: Trade Unionism and the Problem of the American Constitutional Order," 74 J. Am. Hist. 904 (1987).
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true that the labor movement's strategy and its discourse changed dramatically at this time, but the pragmatic impact of repressive court doctrine was
itself so substantial that it is hard to identify separately the more subtle
effects of language on ideology. Moreover, though Forbath does not claim
that law was the only influence on labor's changing ideology, the presence
of so many other political, economic, social, and cultural influences on the
labor movement makes the impact of the "ideological, discursive, and symbolic dimensions of the law" seem insignificant at best.
The fact that this volume fails to succeed in all respects, however,
does not detract from the author's considerable accomplishment. Forbath
brilliantly demonstrates that judicial opinions in the decades surrounding
the turn of the century not only governed the particular labor disputes
before the courts and decided the fate of specific labor-oriented legislation,
they also had a lasting impact on the future directions of the labor movement itself. Nor does he end there. Labor is not depicted as simply reacting
to legal ideology but as using the language of the law-the "rights talk" of
the courts-to create its own theory of the constitution, offering an alternative vision that ultimately prevailed both in the courts and in the legislatures (at 8-9). Forbath thereby demonstrates that, while legal discourse
may sometimes serve to silence a subordinate social group by directing
legal thinking away from the true needs of that constituency, "the language of law [may also supply] invaluable rhetorical resources for articulating those aspirations" (at xii). Law and the Shaping of the American Labor
Movement thus ends by illustrating convincingly that our understanding of
law is not complete if it focuses solely on the official legal texts and interpretations but must also include "legal history from below," incorporating
the "distinctive norms and interpretations of law" proposed and adopted
4
by those outside the halls of power.

THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE LABOR
MOVEMENT
According to the picture drawn by classical labor historians,5 the
American labor movement has always been characterized by its "voluntarist" philosophy, focusing primarily on obtaining benefits for workers
through collective bargaining in the private marketplace rather than
through state regulation of industrial life. Unlike its European counterparts, the American labor movement lacked a politically radical, classbased organization and forswore any effort to use government to change
4. See William E Forbath, Hendrik Hartog, & Martha Minow, "Introduction: Legal
Histories from Below," 1985 Wis. L Rev. 759, 759.
5. Forbath cites to John Commons, Selig Perlman, Seymour Lipset, Philip Taft, Gerald
Grob, and Nathan Fine.
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the balance of power in the marketplace or to redefine the positions of
capital and labor. Forbath draws upon "the new labor historians ' 6 to
demonstrate that, in fact, the American labor movement began as a radical
political movement supporting active state involvement on behalf of workers. The Knights of Labor, for example, the "largest and most influential"
of the early labor organizations, supported a radical program including
workplace regulation, abolition of private banking, public funding for
worker-owned industry, and the nationalization of monopolies (at 12-13).7

By the end of the 19th century, however, the American Federation of
Labor, with its more conservative and antistatist philosophy, had emerged
as the leading voice of labor. While union leaders once talked of ':final
emancipation" from the "wages system," they ended by seeking only rights
to bargain collectively within the context of the existing capitalist order (at
15). The AFL not only failed to support, it actively opposed, enactment of
protective legislation to regulate hours, wages, and workplace conditions
(at 16).8
What explains this sea change in the attitudes of the leadership of the
American labor movement during the last decades of the f9th century, the
so-called Gilded Age? Forbath argues that the structure, attitude, and actions of the government were critical factors in leading trade unions to
rethink and narrow their vision of the role for labor organizations. He
touches briefly-and intriguingly-on ways in which the very form of
American constitutional government helped to mold the nation's labor
politics. 9 But it is the actions of the courts that chiefly interest him here.
6. Forbath cites, among others, David Montgomery, P. K. Edwards, Jeremy Brecher,
Herbert Gutman, and Leon Fink. See Forbath at 11-17.
7. See also David Montgomery, The Fall of the House of Labor: The Workplace, the State,
and American Labor Activism, 1865-1925 at 165-68 (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1987) (describing the legislative program of the Knights of Labor).
8. Like the courts, the AFL and its state counterparts distinguished, and supported,
protective legislation for women and children, judging those classes of individuals incapable
of protecting their own interests in the marketplace. Forbath suggests that the courts first
made this analytical distinction, and the attitude of the AFL unions changed to reflect the
judicial idea of gender dependency (at 17, 52-53). It seems much more likely that, in this
instance, both the unions and the courts were reflecting generally shared attitudes about
women workers. See Alice Kessler-Harris, Out to Work: A Historj of Wage-earningWomen in
the UnitedStates 142, 180-81, 186 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982). The mere fact
that at one time the unions favored broad hours and wages legislation and later promoted

such statutes only for women and children does not prove a shift away from classwide
solidarity.

9. Forbath suggests that the founders successfully structured the government to avoid
domination by any-but particularly any propertyless, class-based-social or sectional faction. They elevated private rights of contract and property to constitutional status and divided power among separate state jurisdictions, thus making it harder to mount a legislative
assault on power and privilege. The nature of political parties, with their cross-class ties of
patronage, ethnicity, and neighborhood, compounded the difficulty of developing effective
class-based labor politics. Finally, the elite status of those who were selected to be federal
and state judges made them sympathetic to the "austere liberal social vision" that discouraged class-based activity, thus making them more likely to suppress the more radical organiz-
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THE IMPACT OF LAISSEZ-FAIRE
CONSTITUTIONALISM
Forbath first addresses the impact of federal and state court review of
protective legislation passed in response to labor's efforts to reform the
workplace through affirmative government intervention. Among the legislative enactments considered by the courts were laws establishing minimum wages and maximum hours for workers, forbidding tenement labor,
outlawing discrimination against union members, regulating weighing procedures at coal mines, mandating regular payment of wages, and regulating
company stores and pafment of workers in company scrip. The majority of
these were struck down as unconstitutional infringements of liberty of contract.'0 Often, if a court did not declare a regulatory statute unconstitutional, it would nevertheless limit the law's effectiveness by narrowly
construing it.
Forbath argues that judicial nullification of labor legislation taught
union leaders that their efforts likely would be futile if they focused on
obtaining relief through the legislatures. Judges, not legislators, held the
trump cards and were not reluctant to play them. Forbath points to the
strategy debates within the AFL and the United Mine Workers in the
1890s to show that court decisions played a prominent role in convincing
unions to abandon their broad political program of legislative reform and
to concentrate instead on "simply seeking legislation to protect workers'
organizations from public and private repression" (at 53-56). The "obdurate state of American courts" led some to take a more radical path, scorning the political process in favor of direct action and syndicalism under the
auspices of the Industrial Workers of the World (at 48-49). The liberty of
contract cases were central to the arguments of Gompers and others that
labor should focus on protecting itself in the marketplace through collective bargaining and abandon the futile attempt to obtain reform through
legislative proposals.
Gompers had particular reason to learn this lesson well. In his early
orgaunizing years with the Cigarmakers International Union, Gompers
worked extensively, and successfully, for enactment of a statute prohibiting the manufacture of cigars in tenement buildings. The New York Court
of Appeals struck down two successive versions of the law." In his autobiography, Gompers reports that the experience convinced him that the
ing tactics of the unions (at 27-34). Forbath promises to expand upon these thoughts in a
future work.
10. In a useful appendix, the book contains a comprehensive listing of court decisions
respecting legislation implementing labor's major and secondary demands during the Gilded
Age and a selection of cases striking down significant categories of labor laws during the
1910s and 1920s (at 177-92).
11. See In re Jacobs, 98 N.Y. 98 (1885) (striking down the reenacted version).
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"power of the courts to pass upon constitutionality of law" made that
method of reform ineffective. It was through collective bargaining and economic pressure, not through legislation, that the union accomplished its
ends (at 39-42). While we should be wary of Gompers' post hoc explanations of his motivations and understandings, the contemporaneous documentation appears to support the importance of judicial nullification as a
significant shaping influence on the directions in which the leadership of
the labor movement moved in the 1890s and thereafter.
It is, however, almost exclusively from the leadership that we hear in
Forbath's telling. Although Forbath studied a wide array of sources in an
effort to sample "the diverse ways in which trade unionists encountered
judges' words and deeds" (at 6), he reports on only the statements of a few
of the prominent union leaders. The minimalist politics of those leaders
prevailed in the shaping of AFL programs, which suggests the acquiescence of ordinary union members, but we learn little of the attitudes and
responses of the rank and file except that they voted to approve the leadership's voluntarist policies. At least one of those votes, however-the 1894
rejection of the socialist platform of England's Independent Labour
Party-apparently occurred only through "parliamentary sleight-of-hand"
by Gompers and other AFL leaders after a majority of the AFL's constituent unions had endorsed the platform (at 14). Forbath's own evidence
thus suggests that the victory of voluntarist policies was attributable to
more than the effect of judicial nullification. Because the leadership was
instrumental and ultimately successful in shaping the policies of the unions, the impact of law on the movement nonetheless can be demonstrated
through the words of Gompers, Charles Moyers (president of the Western
Federation of Miners), Adolph Strasser (Gompers' mentor in the Cigarmakers International Union), and John Mitchell (president of the United
Mine Workers) as they debated their opponents, but the extent of that
impact cannot be evaluated fully without more voices being heard.
Forbath's thesis fits nicely with the traditional view of the courts of
this era as bastions of laissez-faire constitutionalism, invalidating virtually
every legislative effort to regulate business and industry; he adds much by
showing that what the courts did helped to alter the course of the American labor movement. As Forbath notes, however, some commentators
have recently challenged the view that the courts were as hostile to regulatory reform legislation during this period as generally believed.' Melvin
Urofsky, in particular, argues that many labor statutes were in fact upheld,
including hours and wages regulation for women, minors, and workers
12. See, e.g., Morton Keller, Affairs of State: Public Lfe in Late Nineteenth Centuiy
America 369 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, Belknap Press, 1977); John
Semonche, Charting the Future: The Supreme Court Responds to a ChangingSociety, 1890-1920
at xi (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1978).
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in hazardous occupations, and workers compensation systems.' 3 The
Supreme Court, Urofsky concludes, "was as progressive as most reformers
14
could desire."'
Although Forbath relegates his response to such scholarship to a footnote (at 51 n.79), his entire thesis undermines this reevaluation of the
laissez-faire jurisprudence of the courts. Even if the vast majority of regulatory statutes were upheld in the years between 1880 and 1930, it is clear
from Forbath's review that labor reform statutes were particularly likely to
be overturned. Many court approvals of legislation occurred near or after
the turn of the century, after the labor movement had already altered its
organizing focus in response to earlier court activity. Moreover, the courts
were most likely to uphold narrowly drawn statutes, regulating conditions
for special classes of workers, but were never especially receptive to legislation seeking to reform working conditions for all workers.
It also seems likely that both Congress and the state legislatures became more reluctant to enact labor reform in response to judicial nullification of labor statutes in the 1880s and early 1890s. Forbath suggests that
in some states "timorous legislators" responded to pressures from party
leaders and financial backers to scuttle meaningful labor reform (at 49),
but we might also find legislators, no less than labor leaders, frustrated
with the courts' actions and therefore unwilling to promote seemingly futile gestures of lawmaking. Even if individual case outcomes were not always predictable, the courts' dominant ideology undermined reform
efforts. It is worth noting that the courts of three major industrial states,
New York, Illinois, and Pennsylvania, as well as the United States
Supreme Court, regularly issued opinions invalidating regulatory labor legislation. It is not surprising that the sweeping pronouncements of these
influential courts affected reform efforts nationwide, even if some state
courts sometimes upheld selected regulatory statutes.
As Forbath notes, the judicial nullification of legislative reform could,
and did, lead to two widely different responses in the labor movement.
One was the Gompers-AFL path: Concentrate on economic solutions
through collective bargaining, while limiting legislative efforts to the promotion of statutes that would free unions to use their economic power
without court restraint. The other was the "radical anti-statist" path chosen by the Industrial Workers of the World, working toward overthrow of
the capitalist system and scorning the political process. Although these
two arms of the movement had vastly different visions of the utopian
13. See Melvin Urofsky, "State Courts and Protective Legislation during the Progres-

sive Era: A Reevaluation," 72 1. Am. Hist 63, 63 (1985).
14. Melvin Urofsky, "Myth and Reality: The Supreme Court and Protective Legisla-

tion in the Progressive Era," Yearbook of the Supreme Court Historical Society 53, 55 (1983).
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workplace, both chose to rely primarily on the exercise of economic power
in the marketplace to achieve their ends.
But what about those who chose neither of these paths, who continued to press for legislative reform of the workplace throughout this time?
Although Forbath acknowledges at the outset that the AFL's conservative
antistatist philosophy "never enjoyed unchallenged dominion over the labor movement" (at 17), his failure to address more directly the competing
reform vision of socialist labor leaders, industrial unionists, and progressives leaves his analysis incomplete. One cannot judge the impact of restrictive court doctrine on the labor movement without better understanding why some in the movement reacted by redoubling their efforts to enact
a radical transformation through legislative intervention, while others responded largely by withdrawing from the political process and concentrating on direct action, whether through collective bargaining (the AFL) or
planning general strikes (the IWW).
Forbath does not ignore this issue. He suggests that leaders whose
organizing base lay among skilled workers were more receptive to voluntarism because their constituencies had enough economic power to use it
effectively in collective bargaining. He notes, too, that some of the AFL
leaders who promoted voluntarism came from an emigrE-Marxist tradition
within the labor movement that "championed economic action and the
building of workers' own organizations and opposed what it saw as the
dominant American labor tradition's 'middle class' faith in the efficacy of
political reform" (at 55-56). But these explanations suggest that there were
independent forces working toward the AFL's voluntarist perspective, undermining Forbath's claim that the law was a primary force in shaping
labor ideology. Skilled workers might have been likely to concentrate on
obtaining benefits for themselves through their economic power and to
neglect action on behalf of less skilled workers who could not fend for
themselves in the marketplace. If so-and the history of AFL organizing
and the challenge from industrial unionists confirms the potential for just
such a division-then the courts may have played a much less significant
role in changing the focus of the movement. Similarly, if the leadership
was steeped in an ideology that challenged the "efficacy of political reform" even before the courts acted, judicial nullification may have had
little independent impact.
Forbath may be on stronger ground in pointing to the importance of
court decisions in assisting the labor leaders who promoted voluntarism to
win their battles for control against those who remained committed to
legislative reform. "Even those not predisposed to voluntarism recognized
the practical and symbolic barriers that the courts had erected to a broad
politics" (at 57). The futility of obtaining relief from legislatures in the face
of court invalidation appears to have persuaded many that the "surest
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path" for the labor movement, at least temporarily, was reliance on economic, not political, power. Yet the only example Forbath gives of a formal vote in which the AFL leadership sided with Gompers and his allies
apparently was obtained by "parliamentary sleight-of-hand" (at 14).
Forbath's argument would be strengthened considerably if he offered more
evidence of the way in which the AFL decided to adopt the voluntarist
policies of some of its leaders.

JUDICIAL SUPPRESSION OF COLLECTIVE ACTION
Judicial nullification of labor statutes is only part of the picture
Forbath draws. The most powerful part of his book is his extended description of the manner in which the courts, especially the federal courts,
used the labor injunction to suppress many forms of collective action by
trade unions and workers and the impact this form of judicial intervention
had on the labor movement.
In discussing the history of labor injunctions in the courts, Forbath
masterfully weaves together several approaches. He presents a traditional
doctrinal analysis, outlining the manner in which the courts moved from a
narrow conceptual basis, sufficient to warrant enjoining strikes by railroad
workers, to a broad constitutional and common law analysis, supporting
prohibitions against most forms of collective action in all industries. He
offers a statistical analysis, determining the number and percentage of
strikes in which the courts interfered on behalf of employers between 1880
and 1930. Finally, he considers the symbolic power of the law, suggesting
both why the unions' methodology and language may have elicited especially harsh responses from the courts and how the concepts and language
employed by the courts affected lawmakers, the public, and labor itself in
their attitudes toward collective action by workers.
The numbers alone are truly astonishing. By Forbath's "conservative
reckoning," courts issued at least 4,300 injunctions between 1880 and
1930; by the 1920s, 25% of all strikes were the subject of some kind of
restrictive injunction. Although this left many strikes unchallenged by injunction, court interference was especially likely with respect to secondary
actions-sympathy strikes and boycotts. Courts enjoined at least 15% of
recorded sympathy strikes in the 1890s, 25% in the 1900s, and 46% in the
1920s.
Injunctions figured in virtually every railroad strike; in most strikes in
which industrial unionism, "amalgamation," or "federation" was at
issue; in most major organizing and recognition strikes, boycotts,
closed shop or sympathy strikes or anti-union/open-shop lockouts of
significant magnitude; and in a small but still significant and growing
portion of ordinary mine-run strikes. (At 62)
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Moreover, because injunctions were so prevalent, employers and state officials could use the threat of court intervention to break a strike without
actually obtaining a court order.
In addition, the courts often issued blanket antistrike decrees, addressing thousands of workers and anyone who might assist them.
Forbath's examples include a streetcar strike in Indianapolis, where the
city's entire working class was enjoined from aiding the strikers, and mining strikes in West Virginia and Pennsylvania, where whole counties were
the object of permanent injunctions (at 104). There was also the possibility
that federal marshals or troops would be summoned to enforce an injunction; such intervention occurred in more than 500 disputes between 1877
and 1903 (at 118). The courts maintained a highly visible presence in
many strikes, and the possibility of court interference was always
considerable.
The doctrinal history begins during the 1877 railroad strikes, when
federal equity courts holding bankrupt railroads in receivership found it
appropriate and legitimate to intervene to protect the temporarily public
property in the roads. In the middle to late 1880s, these rulings were extended to permit intervention in strikes against railroads not in receivership, based (after 1877) on the Interstate Commerce Act's ban on
discrimination in interstate railroad traffic. Although it was not yet decided whether the ICA reached primary as well as secondary boycott activity, the question became moot when federal courts began finding primary
strikes illegal under the Sherman Antitrust Act (at 66-73).
A second legal weapon emerged in response to the proliferation in
the early 1880s. of citywide secondary boycotts, which involved active
union solicitation of customers throughout a community to cease doing
business with employers viewed as "unfair" because of their treatment of
workers. Mhile earlier cases had found that employers had liberty interests
in their businesses, protecting them from government regulation, courts
now found that employers also had property rights in their business
relations:
Where he had been merely free to run his shop, and use his machinery, as he willed, he now was found to have a property right to do so
that was protected from interference created by a boycott or strike
pressing for adherence to union work rules and standards. Where previously he had been merely free to hire whomever he liked, now he
had a property interest in his employment relations and in the "natural flow" of labor to his shop or factory. (At 88)
This new concept of property rights logically would have led to the
conclusion that all strikes were illegal because they interfered with a business's flow of labor and customers, but no court would go so far. Instead,
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the courts found lawful only strikes seeking immediate benefit, defined
narrowly as wages and working conditions. Other strikes-including all
sympathy strikes and producer or consumer boycotts, as well as strikes for
such purposes as union recognition, adherence to union work rules, and
15
adoption of a closed shop-were unlawful (at 89).
Obviously, court intervention to stop or restrict a strike would
change the balance of economic power and the likely outcome of that labor dispute. Forbath argues that, as with judicial nullification of legislative
reforms, injunctions against strike activity also helped to change the direction of the labor movement itself. First, whatever energy the unions continued to expend on promoting legislative reform efforts was focused
primarily on passing statutes to remove the power of the courts to block
strikes through injunctions, not on enacting other kinds of labor reform.
Thus, the shift toward voluntarism caused in part by court invalidation of
substantive labor statutes was further encouraged by the need to prevent
courts from enjoining strike activity.
Second, the courts were far more likely to enjoin sympathy strikes
and secondary activity-the "only major weapon" of cross-class solidarity-than to restrain strikes in which workers acted directly in support of
their own labor negotiations. The consequent inability of labor to use
these tools, like the inability to obtain effective substantive reform through
legislation, convinced many labor leaders "that broad, class-based strategies and industrial ambitions were too costly and self-defeating" (at 77,
78). "In the shadow of so many broken big strikes and bootless broad
initiatives, many thought it wise to conserve and build upon what
'worked'-minimalist politics, craft unionism, high dues, and restrained
but well-calculated strike policies" (at 95-96). By the late 1880s, citywide
boycotts had been virtually replaced by the tactic of simply publicizing
"unfair" employers through labor publications. This, too, was an effective
tool, but a majority of federal courts and then the Supreme Court outlawed it as a violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act.16 By the mid-1890s,
Gompers and many other labor leaders chose to abandon illegal sympathy
strikes as well (at 77-78).
Forbath also argues that, beyond their role in forcing labor leaders to
make pragmatic decisions abandoning class-based economic weapons,
court injunctions and rhetoric affected lawmakers' and the public's perceptions of the labor movement in ways that magnified the impact of individual court orders. By issuing blanket injunctions and arresting hundreds of
15. The courts were not uniform in condemning all but the narrowest rationales for
strikes. Forbath cites a few state decisions upholding consumer boycotts and approving
strikes to enforce union work standards or to force discharge of nonunion workers (at 89
n.1 19). But it appears that the great majority of cases found most such collective action to be
unlawful, and the impact of those cases was sufficient to affect labor strategy.
16. See Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908).
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striking workers as criminals for disobeying their orders, by deputizing
company strikebreakers, and by providing the basis for sending state or
federal troops to police a labor dispute, the courts created a vision of organized workers as outlaws. Indeed, that vision-striking workers as
threatening and potentially violent-appears to persist today in decisions
justifying bans on certain forms of picketing. 7 Such imagery helped to
reduce workers' ability to persuade employers and the public of the justice
of their cause.
Gompers himself talked of the manner in which law "disfigured" the
discourse of judges, newspapers, and the public about the labor movement
(at 125). "The courts had woven a powerful web of associations between
strikers' use of economic 'coercion' and their use of brute physical force,
between popular images of criminal conspirators and the legal construction of virtually all secondary actions as conspiracies in restraint of trade,
and between picketing in any fashion and threats of violence" (at 126).
Federal court injunctions were used by employers to prod reluctant or sympathetic state officials into toughening their policies against strikers and
helped to justify actions such as arming strikebreakers and jailing pickets
(at 106-7). Even when no injunction was sought or issued in a labor dispute, company and state officials could and did use the language of the law
to condemn labor's actions and justify suppression of collective action (at
126).

THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE LAW
Forbath is overwhelmingly successful in demonstrating the extent to
which the courts, particularly the federal courts, intervened in labor disputes in the 1880s and 1890s and how that intervention influenced both
the tactics of the labor movement and the perceptions of the public about
labor organizing. His narrative raises one further question about how law
affected labor, however. When the courts closed the door to restructuring
industrial relations through affirmative legislative regulation, labor leaders
turned to collective bargaining as their strategy for reform. When the
courts developed theories that barred sympathy strikes and secondary boycotts, labor refocused its collective action on primary strike activity. When
the federal courts restricted even ordinary strikes, however, the same labor
leaders did not shift once again to different strategies not yet foreclosed by
court action. They chose, instead, to defy court orders and to argue repeatedly (and ultimately successfully) for changed concepts of freedom of contract that would support rather than undermine labor's right to organize
collectively.
17. Diane Avery, "Images of Violence in Labor Jurisprudence: The Regulation of Picketing and Boycotts, 1844-1921," 37 Buff. L Rev. 1, 2-5 (1988-89).
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Thus, Forbath describes how labor leaders took the oppositional rhetoric of the courts and, by drawing upon the Thirteenth Amendment as a
source of rights for all working people and the First Amendment as a
source of the right to protest, transformed the courts' own opinions into
an alternative constitutional interpretation supporting the right of labor to
strike (at 135-141). But why, as Forbath asks at the outset of his study (at
xii), did labor defy or seek to alter some of these constraints placed upon
them while altering its own behavior in response to other constraints?
Why did invalidation of regulatory statutes and restrictions on secondary
boycotts and sympathy strikes make labor change its approach to organizing, while injunctions against primary strike activity led to civil disobedience and efforts to manipulate legal doctrine?
One answer might be simply that when faced with a threat to its final
organizing tool, the primary strike for better wages and working conditions, labor was forced to dig in its heels and fight back. Having been
blocked in every other avenue first, labor could retreat no farther. But all
these doctrines coexisted and threatened labor throughout the early years
of the movement, when primary and sympathy strikes, secondary boycotts,
and legislative reform were all part of labor's strategic arsenal. Why did the
movement more easily abandon some strategies while retaining others,
even in the face of hostile court action?
It seems likely that the answer lies in combining Forbath's explanation-the impact of court decisions and doctrine-with the more traditional explanations for the generally conservative perspective of the
American labor movement: lack of class consciousness among American
workers, organizational ideology of the AFL, turf battles among major labor leaders, ethnic divisions within the workforce.' The law pointed labor
away from virtually all forms of collective action; that its leaders came to
accept some but not all of the restrictions suggests that other forces were at
work besides the pressure of adverse court doctrine.
To understand fully what happened to the labor movement between
1880 and 1932, then, we need to know more about the rest of the picture
than Forbath tells us. Indeed, one aspect missing from Forbath's study is
any discussion of the political, economic, social, and cultural contexts in
which the labor movement and the courts operated. It is clear, for instance, that the strength of the labor movement varied according to the
state of the economy, with workers having more power and being better
able to use the strike weapon during boom periods.' 9 Attitudes about labor organizing were affected by more than the discourse of the courts in
this period. For example, state officials and the public were particularly
18. See Forbath at 10 &.nn.1-2; 134-35 & nn.23-25.
19. See, e.g., David Montgomery, Workers' Control in America: Studies in the History of

Work, Technology, and LaborStruggles 91-94 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).
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hostile to collective action during World War I, when that tactic was tied
to questions about loyalty to the national war effort, and in the immediate
postwar period, when labor unrest was seen as connected to the communist revolution in Russia. 20 The political fortunes of labor varied according
to the success or failure of sympathetic candidates and party organizations.
Yet with the exception of a section about enactment of the Wagner Act
and passage of anti-injunction statutes on the state and federal level,
Forbath's narrative excludes discussion of any of these or similar events.
Nor does Forbath include much about the labor movement's continuing and renewed support for reform through legislation once the road
blocks were removed by the Supreme Court. Many of labor's "core legislative goals" of the 1880s and 1890s-to establish minimum wages, maximum hours, and regular wage payment, and to bar discrimination against
union members-were enacted, with labor's support, in the 1930s. Labor
has continued to promote, successfully, regulatory statutes respecting
workplace health and safety, private pension plans, and job discrimination. It seems that labor may have abandoned its more radical goals of
restructuring the economic system, but was only temporarily dissuaded
from the strategy of obtaining relief through legislation. Perhaps it is precisely this deradicalization of the movement that Forbath sees as the primary effect of court obstructionism, but again, law seems to be only one-and a relatively weak one-of many factors explaining that shift.
Of course, Forbath does not claim to be telling the whole story of the
labor movement from the 1880s to the 1930s. He is adding a new element
to the explanations previously offered, and he has immeasurably enriched
our understanding of the events of those years by doing so. He has fulfilled
his purpose of demonstrating that courts and legal doctrine had an independent impact on the labor movement of the late 19th and early 20th
centuries-that law affected as well as reflected the social forces at work.
The next step will be to integrate Forbath's vision with the surrounding
social, political, economic, and cultural environment and to explore the
interplay between law and those other forces.

THE LEGACY OF THE GILDED AGE
The doctrinal concepts that emerged in the labor law of the Gilded
Age, and the choices labor leaders made as a result, still affect both the
discourse of the courts on labor issues and the focus of union efforts.
Forbath notes that many of the old common law restraints have been resurrected under the National Labor Relations Act. Virtually all forms of
20. See Selig Perlman & Philip Taft, 4 History of Labour in the United States, 1896-1932
at 412-60 (New York: Macmillan Co., 1935).
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secondary boycotts and strikes, for example, are illegal under the Act, despite claims to First Amendment protection for peaceful picketing (at
165-66).21 Primary strikes can be enjoined, despite the existence of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act, if the governing contract contains a no-strike
clause.22 Attempts to invoke labor solidarity by asking workers to refuse to
handle struck goods are unlawful. 23 Workers who refuse to cross another
24
union's picket line may be replaced permanently by their employers.
The restrictive Gilded Age view of the proper objects of union organizing persists in modern law as well. In the 1890s, the courts limited
permissible strikes to those undertaken for immediate gain, defined as encompassing only wages and working conditions but not objects such as
adoption of union work rules, union recognition, or maintenance of a
closed shop (at 89). In modern labor law, we have the NLRA's distinction
between mandatory and permissive subjects of bargaining. "Wages, hours,
and other terms and conditions of employment" are mandatory subjects,
so labor and management are required to bargain in good faith over them
and can use economic weapons--strikes and lockouts-to achieve their
demands. Subjects such as product prices and design, financing, benefits
for retired workers, union label agreements, and decisions to sell or close a
business are considered within management prerogatives and therefore are
permissive subjects of bargaining. A union cannot insist that such issues
be part of the collective bargaining process, nor can it strike to obtain
terms with respect to them. 25 Courts today may have a broader understanding of what constitutes "terms and conditions of employment" than
they did in the Gilded Age--"union shops" are a mandatory subject of
bargaining, for-instance-but the notion of a limited sphere of legitimate
labor concern persists.
21. The only lawful form of secondary boycott is leafletting to persuade customers to
boycott a business that continues to do business with a struck employer. See DeBartolo
Corp v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568 (1988). Picketing
a secondary business to induce consumers not to buy a struck product is considered primary, not secondary, activity and is therefore lawful. NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers,
Local 760 (Tree Fruits), 377 U.S. 58 (1964). Even this form of boycotting is unlawful, however, if the struck product or employer forms a central part of the secondary employer's
business. NLRB v. Retail Store Employees 1001 (Safeco), 447 U.S. 607 (1980).
22. See Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970). In contrast,
sympathy strikes-which have been held to be unlawful under the NLRA-may not be enjoined, because such strikes generally are found not forbidden by no-strike clauses, and
therefore they do not implicate the "private dispute settlement mechanisms agreed upon by
the parties" to a labor contract. Buffalo Forge Co. v. Steelworkers, 428 U.S. 397 (1976).
23. Local 1976, United Bhd. of Carpenters v. NLRB (Sand Door), 357 U.S. 93 (1958).
Sand Door involved picketing at a secondary; it is not clear following the decision in Tree
Fruits (cited in note 21) whether leafletting for that purpose would be lawful.
24. See, e.g., NLRB v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 646 F.2d 1352, 1363-64 (9th Cit.
1981); NLRB v. Browning-Ferris Industr., 700 F.2d 385 (7th Cir. 1983).
25. See generally Florian Barrosic & Roger C. Hartley, Labor Relations in the Private
Sector 9 9.04 (Philadelphia- American Law Institute-American Bar Association Committee
on Continuing Professional Education, 1986).
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Moreover, the triumph of the voluntarist perspective means that labor and management are required only to bargain in good faith, not to
agree to any particular terms. The Supreme Court has held that even
when an employer acts in bad faith, the NLRB can order employers only to
bargain properly, not to accept terms. 26 One commentator has suggested
that, as a result, management can provide the appearance of good faith
while practicing intransigence at the bargaining table. Neither labor, with
relatively weak economic power compared to management, nor the NLRB,
27
with its limited mandate, can force management to bargain genuinely.
The rule that dissenting employees in an agency shop may be forced
to contribute only to expenditures "germane" to the union's collective
bargaining activity similarly reflects a Gilded Age vision of the role of labor unions. The United States Supreme Court has interpreted the Railway
Labor Act and the NLRA to permit unions to compel employee contributions only for the "costs of negotiating and administering collective agreements, and the cost of the adjustment and settlement of disputes," but not
"to support candidates for public office" or to advance political programs. 28 Organizing employees in other companies, lobbying for labor legislation, and participating in social, charitable, and political events were
found to be unrelated to the unions' role as bargaining unit representative.
Similarly, the Court recently barred a state college faculty union from
spending compelled dues to lobby the legislature to promote financial support for public education, to support another bargaining unit, to publish
newsletter articles reporting on litigation of other bargaining units, and to
engage in public relations efforts on behalf of the teaching profession.
Such views are an outgrowth of the voluntarist perspective adopted by
Gompers and the AFL in the 1900s and 1910s, reflecting a belief that
unions exist to obtain more of the economic pie for their members
through marketplace negotiation rather than to be part of a broad classwide movement for political and economic reform.
Finally, the aftermath of the Gilded Age can be seen in the battle over
the centerpiece of labor's current legislative and political agenda, the enactment of a federal law prohibiting management from using permanent
replacements for striking workers.2 9 The dispute over the use of perma26. H. K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970).
27. Paul Weiler, "Striking a New Balance: Freedom of Contract and the Prospects for
Union Representation," 98 Harv. L Ret. 351, 357-63 (1983).
28. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 764, 768 (1961) (RLA);
Communication Workers of America v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988) (NLRA).
29. Banning permanent replacement of striking workers has been a priority for labor
for several years. Such legislation has passed the House of Representatives but not the Senate. On 30 March 1993, the Clinton administration announced its support for a permanent
replacement ban, reversing the position taken by previous Republican administrations. See
James Risen, "Clinton Seeks Ban on Striker Replacements," LA. Times, 31 March 1993, at
Al. A Republican filibuster is nonetheless expected to block passage in the Senate.
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nent replacements is a battle to define the contours of the marketplace
within which labor and management meet. The issue is crucially important
to labor, therefore, precisely because the movement chose to concentrate
on gaining its objectives in the marketplace. The discussion of labor's proposed legislation revolves around the question whether banning permanent replacements would "tilt the balance" of economic power toward the
unions or restore a balance that once existed. As in the early 1900s, labor's
legislative agenda is directed principally toward freeing labor to use its economic power effectively in collective bargaining rather than on reforming
the workplace directly through legislation-though, as noted previously,
the latter goal has hardly been abandoned. The primacy of the marketplace is visible as well in the doctrine of federal preemption, which forbids
the states to enact measures that alter the balance of economic power.
Indeed, it was on this basis that courts have invalidated local laws regulat30
ing the use of replacement workers.
Moreover, the fact that employers are able, when they wish, to find
sufficient numbers of workers to cross picket lines and take permanent
jobs from strikers is itself a mark of labor's failure to establish intra- and
cross-class solidarity among workers, a legacy of choices made in the early
20th century. The final irony is that, despite labor's involvement with regulatory legislation assisting all workers, its historical focus on collective
bargaining has resulted in public perception of labor as simply another
special interest group in the political process rather than as a broad classbased force for progressive reform.
Forbath ends on a cautionary note. Labor should be hesitant to reject
the current regulatory scheme, as constricting as it sometimes is, in favor
of "deregulating" and thereby according labor new freedom for collective
action. "No politics remains innocent of that which it contests,"31 and the
labor movement is no exception. Unions chose the route to voluntarism
under the influence of law-imposed restraints. Although the legal landscape has changed, the impact of law remains. Labor should beware of
developing its new long-term organizing strategy in response to the labor
discourse of the courts without at least attempting to break free of the
bonds created by the language of the law.
30. See Employers Ass'n Inc. v. United Steelworkers of American, 803 F. Supp. 1558
(D. Minn. 1992); Opinion of the Justices, 571 A.2d 805 (Me. 1989). But see Midwest Motor
Express v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters Local 120, 494 N.W.2d 895 (1993) (upholding state statute forbidding use of permanent replacement workers; lower court found statute not preempted because of the compelling local interest in maintaining peace during labor disputes);
Both Employers Ass'n and Midwest Motor Express have been appealed and opinions are expected shortly. See generally Michael H. LeRoy, "The MacKay Radio Doctrine of Permanent Striker Replacements and the Minnesota Picket Line Act: Questions of Preemption,"
77 Minn. L Rev. 843 (1993).
31. Elizabeth Fox-Genovese, Feminism without Illusions: A Critique of Individualism 17
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991).

